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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case

At
the Victim

trial

for vehicular manslaughter, the Magistrate excluded evidence

had drugs

in his

The Magistrate denied defense motions

Ochoa received over

the Victim less than one

month

eight hundred pages of medical

prior to

trial.

to continue the trial after

and toxicology records regarding

Over half 0f those pages were received 0n

of trial. Finally, the Magistrate allowed the forensic pathologist, called by the State as
Witness, t0 testify directly

that

system and was deemed to have been operating a motor vehicle under

the inﬂuence of such drugs.

Alej andra

from the jury

the eve

its

expert

from the Victim’s medical records, although the pathologist had n0

independent opinions regarding the injuries sustained by the Victim. The District Court correctly
held these decisions by the Magistrate t0 be in error, t0 be prejudicial, and t0 affect the
substantial rights 0f Ms. Ochoa.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings

On April 26,

2018, Alejandra Ochoa was involved in a car accident after pulling out of a

Jackson’s gas station at the corner 0f Midway and Karcher in

— P. 261,

(Trial Tr., p. 260, L.

1

Ochoa’s vehicle was

hit

140, Ls. 1-9).)

It

Nampa,

Idaho. (Exhibits, p. 139

L. 8); p. 140-141 (Trial Tr., p. 267, L. 11

by a motorcycle driven by

— p. 268,

the Victim. (Exhibits, pp.

1,

L. 18).)

140 (Trial

Ms.
Tr., p.

took some time for police t0 respond to the accident scene and the Victim was

transported to the hospital prior t0 police arrival. (Exhibits, p. 140 (Trial Tr., 265, L. 15

— 22).)

Police and paramedics believed the Victim’s injuries were not life-threatening. (Exhibits, p. 140
(Trial Tr., p. 267, Ls. 7-10); p. 185 (Trial Tr., p. 444, Ls. 6-1 1).)

The Victim passed away

at the

hospital roughly seven hours later. (Exhibits, p. 94 (Trial Tr., p. 83, Ls. 11-13); p. 154 (Trial Tr.,

p.

323, Ls. 18-21).) (R., p. 249.)

On October 23,

2018, a criminal complaint was ﬁled against

Ms. Ochoa, charging her With misdemeanor vehicular manslaughter.
Ms. Ochoa requested discovery from the

The discovery request included requests
a

summary

State

0n November 28, 2019.

for physical examinations

20-22)

(R., pp.

and scientiﬁc

tests, as

well as

or report of any testimony intended to be introduced through I.R.E. 703, including

the facts and data for those opinions. Initially, the case

The

(R., p. 32.)

State ﬁled a

order continuing the

February

(R., pp. 12-13.)

1,

trial t0

motion

April

3,

was

set for jury trial

t0 continue the jury trial date

0n March 20, 2019.

0n January 31, 2019 and the

2019 was signed by the magistrate court without hearing on

2019. (R., pp. 33-36.)

On March

6,

2019, the State ﬁled a motion in limine seeking t0 exclude evidence 0f

drugs in the Victim’s system. (R., pp. 43-47.) The State disclosed Dr. Groben as an expert
witness on

March

25, 2019, nine days before

Which Dr. Groben based

March

trial,

his expert opinions. (Exhibits, pp. 24-26.)

26, 2019, to exclude the testimony of Dr.

On March 28,

Groben due

Ms. Ochoa ﬁled a motion 0n

t0 the late disclosure.

(R.,

59-61 .)

2019, the magistrate court heard argument 0n the State’s motion in limine and Ms.

Ochoa’s motion to exclude Dr. Groben from
court did not rule

Ochoa 0n notice

way of pre-trial

testifying.

that she

would have

evidentiary hearing.

its

was rescheduled

(Exhibits, pp. 18-70.)

0n the admissibility 0f the evidence 0f the Victim’s drug

May 8,

was

2019. (R., 75-76.)

trial

trial.

date t0

May

1,

(R., pp. 69-70.)

2019.

Ms.

relevant

The magistrate court denied Ms. Ochoa’s request

second motion t0 continue the
for

The magistrate

use, but did put

the burden of showing that the evidence

exclude Dr. Groben’s testimony but continued the
the State ﬁled

but did not disclose the facts and data upon

by

t0

On March 28,

Without hearing, the

2019,
trial

At

the

March

28th hearing, the magistrate court also ruled that the State

Ms. Ochoa ﬁled a motion
118.)

The

to continue

State ﬁled an objection t0

exclude Ms. Ochoa’s expert. (R., pp. 128-161.)

pages 0f medical records from the

Ms. Ochoa’s ﬁrst motion
that a continuance

was needed

On April

State. (Exhibits, p.

t0 continue

in order t0

On April

(R., pp. 63-64.)

and disclosed an expert witness

Ms. Ochoa’s request

to the State.

for a continuance

12, 2019,

75 (4/18/19

was argued 0n April

have adequate time

to

from Ms. Ochoa. Ms. Ochoa

disclose the Victim’s medical records without a speciﬁc request

ﬁled the speciﬁc request for medical records that same date.

had no duty

t0

2019,

10,

(R., pp. 87-

and ﬁled a motion

t0

Ms. Ochoa received 366

T11, p. 4, Ls. 12-14).)

18, 2019.

Ms. Ochoa argued

review the medical records (366

pages) that were just received, that the toxicology report had not yet been received, and the
unavailability 0f the defense expert. (Exhibits, p. 75 (4/18/19 Tr., p. 4, L. 12

3-20).)

The magistrate court denied

Tr., p. 17, L.

20 —p.

On April 23,

the request ﬁnding

no good cause.

— p.

5, L. 6; p.

6 Ls.

(Exhibits, p. 78 (4/18/19

18, L. 17).)

2019, an evidentiary hearing was held 0n the admissibility 0f the evidence

0f drugs in the Victim’s system. Testimony was taken from David Cavanaugh, the defense
expert; Dr. Groben, the State’s forensic pathologist;

investigating ofﬁcer. (Exhibits, p. 73.). Mr.

0f the factors involved in a crash (Exhibits,

Cavanaugh testiﬁed that

p.

84 (4/23/19 TL,

drugs can affect a person’s ability t0 drive (Exhibits,

2).);

— p.

and Trooper Madenford, the primary

p.

it is

p. 42, L.

84-85 (4/23/19

7

important t0

— p.

know

43, L. 2).);

Tr., p. 43, L. 3

all

how

— p.

46, L.

signs 0f impairment from the elements 0f a crash (Exhibits, p. 86-87 (4/23/19 Tr., p. 51, L. 2

53, L. 19).);

87 (4/23/19 TL,

and the physical evidence 0f a problem with the Victim’s driving. (Exhibits,
p. 54, L.

7

— p.

55, L. 1).) Dr.

results in his report (Exhibits, p.

95 (4/23/19

Groben testiﬁed

that

Tr., p. 84, Ls. 10-20).);

p.

he included the toxicology

and about the physical

effects

of methamphetamine. (Exhibits,

Madenford testiﬁed

that

95 (4/23/19

Tr., p. 85, L.

19

— p.

86, L. 17).) Trooper

he made a ﬁnding in his report that the Victim was under the inﬂuence

ofmethamphetamine. (Exhibits,

At

p.

p.

97 (4/23/19

Tr., p. 93, L.

20 —

p. 94, L. 19).)

the conclusion of this testimony, the magistrate court ruled that

none of the experts

could testify as to the level 0f impairment With a reasonable degree 0f certainty, therefore, any

testimony regarding the drugs in the Victim’s system would be speculative. The magistrate court
further held that

any probative value of the information was substantially outweighed by

prejudicial effect.

However, the magistrate court

failed t0 disclose

What prejudicial

information would have if the testimony was admitted. (Exhibits, p. 100 (4/23/19
6-21)).

The magistrate court

also ruled that the defense

would be precluded from

its

effect the

Tr., p. 104, Ls.

offering any

testimony regarding the Victim’s failure t0 take measures t0 avoid the collision. (Exhibits,

p.

101

(4/23/19 Tr., p. 110, Ls. 12-18).)

At

the April 23rd hearing,

have sufﬁcient time

to

Ms. Ochoa renewed her motion

t0 continue the trial in order t0

review the medical records, speak With hospital

staff,

possible expert Witnesses. (Exhibits, p. 101 {4/23/19 Tr., p. 111, Ls. 8-24).)
court denied this request, again, ﬁnding

n0 good cause

and deliberate With

The magistrate

for a continuance. (Exhibits, p. 102

(4/23/19 Tr., p. 112, Ls. 12-25).) Ms. Ochoa, once more, renewed her request for a continuance

on the morning of trial. Ms. Ochoa ﬁnally received the toxicology report
2019, the evening before the

start

of the

(Exhibits, p. 102 (Trial Tr., p. 114, L. 21

trial.

— p.

records contained Bradyl material and Ms.

1

Reference

is

prosecution

is

Grube

v.

at

4:00 p.m. on

The toxicology report was 441 pages
116, L. 7).)

Ms. Ochoa

May 7,

long.

also maintained that the

Ochoa should be afforded adequate time

t0

review

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), Which established that “the
bound t0 disclose t0 the defense all exculpatory evidence known to the state 0r in its possession.”

t0

State,

134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 797 (2000) (emphasis added).

the records. (Exhibits, p. 104-105 (Trial Tr., p. 122, L. 7

that

its

— p.

Witness was in possession of the toxicology report well before

defense. (Exhibits, p. 106 (Trial TL, p. 128, Ls. 15-16).)

The

125, L. 6).)

The

it

State admitted

was disclosed

to the

State also claimed that the report

contained no exculpatory information, based on the fact that the toxicology results had been

excluded from evidence. (Exhibit 106,

Once

again, the defense

motion

p.

129-130 (Trial

Tr., p. 129, L.

t0 continue the trial

was

denied.

19

— p.

130, L. 9).)

The magistrate

court

found that Ms. Ochoa failed to show that the toxicology report was exculpatory evidence or that
the State

had a duty

t0 disclose

it.

(Exhibits, p. 107 (Trial Tr., p. 134, L. 4

magistrate court further ruled that the defense

0n the day before

trial

because

it

was

t0

blame

for receiving

— p.

The

135, L. 9).)

441 pages 0f discovery

waited until March, 2019 t0 request documents 0f Which

— p.

aware in December, 2018. (Exhibits, 107-108

(Trial Tr., p. 135, L. 10

magistrate court also clariﬁed that the defense

would be precluded from mentioning

136, L. 14).)

it

was

The

the drugs in

the Victim’s system during cross-examination 0f the State’s witnesses. (Exhibits, p. 108 (Trial

Tr., p. 136, Ls. 15-22).)

The jury trial

thereafter

commenced and was held over May

8-9, 2019.

During Dr.

Groben’s testimony as the State’s expert witness regarding cause 0f death, the State asked Dr.

Groben

to elaborate

on what he had learned about the Victim’s

(Exhibits, p. 156 (Trial Tr., p. 328, Ls. 9-1 1).)

(Exhibits, p. 156 (Trial Tr., p. 328, L. 12).)

under I.R.E. 703. (Exhibits,

p.

156 (Trial

injuries

from the medical records.

The defense objected on hearsay grounds.

The

Tr., p.

State argued that the information should

328, L. 14-15).) After testimony

outside the presence 0f the jury, the magistrate court ruled that Dr.

Groben could

come

was provided

testify to

hearsay evidence from the medical records regarding the Victim’s injuries because the
information would help the jury understand the cause of death. (Exhibits,

p.

in

160 (Trial

Tr., p.

The magistrate court

346, Ls. 11-19).)

failed to use a balancing test in assessing

Whether

to

admit the hearsay evidence.

At

the conclusion 0f the

trial,

manslaughter against Ms. Ochoa.

the jury rendered a verdict 0f guilty 0f vehicular

(R., p. 197).

Ms. Ochoa appealed

t0 the District Court. (R., pp.

199-202.) The District reversed Ms. Ochoa’s judgment 0f conviction and remanded the case for

a

new trial.

(R., p. 238.)

Speciﬁcally, the District Court held (1) the magistrate erred in granting

the State’s motion in limine excluding evidence 0f drugs in the Victim (R., p. 241.); (2) the

magistrate erred

by denying Ms. Ochoa’s motions

magistrate erred

by allowing hearsay testimony from

to continue (R., p. 244.);

and

(3) the

the medical records (R., p. 246.)

The

State

timely appealed. (R., pp 253-255.)

IS SUES

1.

Did the

District

2.

Did the

District

Court err by concluding that the Victim’s toxicology results were
competent, relevant, and material evidence to an element of the charge against Ms. Ochoa?
Court err

in

ﬁnding the denial 0f Ms. Ochoa’s motions

t0 continue

was

an abuse 0f discretion?
3.

Did the

evidence

Court err in holding that the Magistrate admitted inadmissible hearsay
allowed Dr. Groben to read into the record material directly from the

District

When

it

Victim’s medical records.

ARGUMENT
I.

The

Court did not err bv concluding that the Victim’s toxicologv results were
competent, relevant, and material t0 the charge against Ms. Ochoa.

District

A. Standard 0f Review

On appeal from a District Court decision made While

acting in

its

appellate capacity, the

appellate court does not review the Magistrate’s decision, but rather directly reviews the decision

0fthe District Court. Pelayo

v.

Pelayo, 154 Idaho 855, 859, 303 P.3d 214, 218 (2013). The

Magistrate’s ﬁndings 0f facts will be reviewed t0 determine whether they are based 0n

substantial

and competent evidence, and the Magistrate’s conclusions 0f law will be assessed

determine Whether they follow from the ﬁndings. Losser

P.3d 758, 760 (2008).

is

would be Without

Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183

However, the question 0f whether evidence

the appellate court Will freely review. State

Evidence

v.

relevant if (a)

it

v.

Joy, 155 Idaho

has any tendency to

the evidence; and (b) the fact

is

make

1, 6,

is

relevant

one 0f law, and

is

304 P.3d 276, 281 (2013).

a fact

more or

less

probable than

by another

rule.

I.R.E. 402.

court has broad discretion in determining the admissibility of evidence. State

Idaho 520, 521, 81 P.3d 1230, 1231 (2003). The
clear abuse 0f discretion

is

shown. State

v.

it

of consequence in determining the action.

I.R.E. 401. Relevant evidence is admissible unless controlled

trial

t0

trial

v.

The

Perry, 139

court’s decision will be upheld unless a

Folk, 162 Idaho 620, 625, 402 P.3d 1073, 1078

(20 1 7).

Admissible evidence

may

otherwise be excluded if its probative value

is

substantially

outweighed by an unfair prejudice. I.R.E. 403. The abuse of discretion standard
a

trial

court’s determination under I.R.E. 403. State

918, 921 (2010).

“T0 determine whether a

trial

v.

is

also used for

Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 P.3d

court has abused

its

discretion, this

Court

considers Whether

it

correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, Whether

it

acted Within the

boundaries of its discretion and consistently With applicable legal standards, and whether

reached

its

decision

by an

exercise 0f reason.”

Reed v. Reed, 137 Idaho

it

44 P.3d 1108,

53, 57,

11 12 (2002).

B.

The

District

Court was correct in holding that evidence 0f drugs in Victim’s system was

competent, relevant, and material evidence t0 the essential element of Whether Ms. Ochoa’s

commission of a trafﬁc infraction was a signiﬁcant cause 0f Victim’s death.

The
negligence

State chooses t0 reframe this issue t0 focus

is

relevant in a criminal case.

The

on Whether comparative or contributory

State argues that the District Court only found the

Victim’s toxicology results t0 be relevant in order t0 prove comparative 0r contributory

negligence, but that

is

a distortion 0f the District Court’s ﬁndings.

The

District

Court correctly

held that the evidence 0f drugs in the Victim’s system was legally relevant to the issues
this case

and speciﬁcally

to the

afﬁrm

erroneous legal theory.”

“It is

in

well established that this Court will use the

the correct decision of a district court even

Huber v. Lightforce USA, Ina, 159 Idaho

(2016) (citing J.R. Simplot C0.

hand

element of Whether Ms. Ochoa’s negligence was a signiﬁcant

cause contributing t0 the Victim’s death.
correct legal theory to

at

v.

Idaho State Tax

Comm ’n,

When

it is

based 0n an

833, 854, 367 P.3d 228, 249

120 Idaho 849, 853, 820 P.2d 1206,

1210 (1991)).

The

State contends that the presence 0f drugs in the Victim

issue of causation.

It

bases

its

not relevant to the material

argument on a discussion in Thompson

proximate cause and intervening causes. Thompson

647 (2019). The State takes the position
it

is

v.

State,

v.

State regarding

164 Idaho 821, 826, 436 P.3d 642,

that the Victim’s toxicology cannot

does not meet the deﬁnition 0f an intervening cause under Thompson.

Id.

be relevant because
This argument

fails

for a

number of reasons.

position

on an

issue

First

of all, the State did not raise

must be raised

Hoskz'ns, 165 Idaho 217, 222,

at the

this position

below. The party’s

lower court to be preserved for appeal. State

443 P.3d 231, 236 (2019); State

v.

v.

Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99, 439

P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019). The State only argued that the toxicology results were speculative and
overly prejudicial to the courts below.

Second, the State argues that the death in

cannot escape criminal
is

liability,

the intervening event that

making

this case

was a foreseeable event so Ms. Ochoa

the Victim’s toxicology results irrelevant?

must have been unforeseeable. State

375, 223 P.3d 750, 758 (2009)

.

“To

v.

foreseen by Ms. Ochoa. In

was an

fact,

relieve a defendant 0f criminal lability, an intervening

97 (4/23/19

the state’s

is

Tr., p. 94, Ls. 2-19); p.

crime or an intentional

The

Victim’s use of a

entirely independent act that could not

“driving under the inﬂuence”, which

p.

it

Lampien, 148 Idaho 367,

cause must be an unforeseeable and extraordinary occurrence.” Id.
cocktail of illegal substances

However,

tort constitutes

own

have been reasonably

expert categorized the Victim’s actions as

a crime in the State of Idaho.

98 (4/23/19

I.C. §

18—8004. (Exhibits,

Tr., p. 99, Ls. 15-25).) “In

most contexts, a

an independent, intervening cause that precludes a

defendant’s antecedent crime from being a proximate cause.” Lampien, supra (quotations

omitted).

The ﬁnal ﬂaw

in the State’s argument, relying

and intervening causes,

2

The

State’s

argument

is

0n Thompson

that vehicular manslaughter hinges

that a death

’s

on what

discussion of proximate

is

a signiﬁcant cause of

was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of Ms. Ochoa’s negligent

not borne out by statistics. In 2018 (the most recent year in which data is available), there were
only 27 fatal crashes in Canyon County. U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway Trafﬁc
act

is

Safety Administration, reported at https://cdan.nhtsa.gov/stsi.htm#, June 16, 2020. There were over

16,000 trafﬁc infraction citations ﬁled in Canyon County over that same time period. Canyon County
Magistrate Court Case Filings Statistics Report.

Thompson, 164 Idaho

the death, not proximate cause.

word

is

“signiﬁcant”. In State

v.

“signiﬁcant” in ﬁnding that there

McKay,
was a

v.

McKay, 148 Idaho

436 P.3d

The operative

at 649.

the Court analyzed the importance 0f the

material issue 0f fact in

assistance 0f counsel regarding the jury instructions

State

at 828,

which

McKay’s claim 0f ineffective

failed t0 use the

reasoned that without the word “signiﬁcant”, a jury could convict even

word

“signiﬁcant”.

The Court

567, 57 1-72, 225 P.3d 700, 704-705 (2010).

unlawful act t0 be a negligible cause of death.

word

if

it

further

found McKay’s

Id.

Unlike the Thompson and McKay cases, in Which jury instructions were the issue, the
jury in the case at hand was missing crucial information t0 be able t0

determination 0f what

was a signiﬁcant cause 0f the

that the State claims is not

Victim’s death.

all

his system.

The ISP

itself was

trooper,

Who

not speculative at

all.

was too

that

very information

at the District

Court’s

speculative t0 be relevant.

The Victim did have

investigated the crash, did

several drugs in

ﬁnd that the Victim was

under the inﬂuence based 0n the levels 0f drugs in his system. These are
that are relevant to

a reasoned

0f the factors involved in the case.

State contends the information 0f the Victim’s drug use

However, the information

It is

even relevant. The State actually even scoffs

decision that the jury had the right t0 have and consider

The

make

facts.

driving

These are

facts

whether Ms. Ochoa’s negligence was a signiﬁcant cause 0f the Victim’s

death.

The

State’s speculation

argument

Victim’s system were irrelevant because

rests

0n the Magistrate’s ﬁnding

n0 expert could

that the drugs in the

testify as t0 the level

0f impairment

caused by the drugs. This was not the proper legal standard for determining relevancy. The
speculation argument

0f actual

facts.

T0

is

simply smoke and mirrors which evades the actual issue of the relevancy

ﬁlrther

its

argument 0n speculation, the State

10

cites to cases in

Which expert

opinion was denied because the opinion itself was mere speculation. That

is

case and those cases are not pertinent t0 the true issue. Ms. Ochoa’s expert

ability to testify.

Ms. Ochoa’s expert was denied the

existed. Furthermore,

same

facts.

Ms. Ochoa was denied the

not the issue in this

was not denied

the

ability t0 testify t0 the actual facts that

ability t0 question the State’s experts

on those

Facts that were included in the reports of those same expert witnesses called

by the

State.

Finally, the State argues that

emotional response t0

causing

it,

its

even

if the

evidence

is

relevant, the jury

prejudicial effect t0 outweigh

its

would have an

probative value.

A jury

may have

an emotional response t0 any evidence in a case in which a person has died. In

(if not the

maj ority

of) criminal cases,

it is

the State that seeks t0 introduce evidence

evoke a strong emotional response from the jury. “[T]he

and gruesome,

is

1,

604 (1989)). The evidence

54 (2015) (citing State
in the case at

State routinely uses in cases like

hand

cases in Which the State

employed by

I.R.E. 403.

is

Abdullah and Leavitt. Yet, the State
as a

“meth

is

prejudicial effect

0f the evidence. Here, the potential prejudice

is

775 P.2d 599,

must

concerned that the jury

user”. Luckily, for the thousands of

supportive of emotion-evoking evidence, that

The

Abdullah, 158

not even the type of gruesome evidence the

is

would be prejudiced by the notion 0f the Victim

v.

Leavitt, 116 Idaho 285, 290,

v.

which may

fact that certain evidence is horrifying

not in and 0f itself sufﬁcient reason for exclusion.” State

Idaho 386, 439, 348 P.3d

many

is

not the standard

substantially outweigh the probative value

minor considering the evolving

0f drug use and sympathy towards drug addictions in
Yet, the evidence 0f drugs in the Victim’s system

is

0f the opioid epidemic in

norms

this country.

highly probative evidence t0 the issue 0f

signiﬁcant cause(s) contributing t0 the Victim’s death.

11

light

societal

The

State’s

argument

at its

most basic

is

and the

that a trafﬁc infraction, a car crash,

death of another equals vehicular manslaughter under LC. § 18-4006(3)(c). That

is

the only

explanation for the State’s reasoning that the toxicology results cannot be relevant t0 whether

Ms. Ochoa’s negligence,
of another. However, the

i.e.

trafﬁc infraction,

it is

Even

statute in question is not a per se statute.

has a right to present a defense. State
(2018). But

was a signiﬁcant cause contributing

v.

if

it

to the death

were, Ms.

Ochoa

Austin, 163 Idaho 378, 381-82, 413 P.3d 778, 781-82

not a per se statute. The State had the burden to

show more than just the

three

elements noted above. The State had the burden t0 prove Ms. Ochoa’s negligence as a
signiﬁcant cause contributing t0 the death 0f the Victim.
accident, but to the actual death.

right to

have

all

The

District

Not just

Court did not

contributing t0 the trafﬁc

had the

err in ruling that the jury

0f the evidence in order t0 determine what was and was not a signiﬁcant cause

0f death. The District Court correctly found the evidence t0 be relevant and found

its

probative

value not outweighed by any perceived prejudicial effect.
II.

The

District

Court did not err in ﬁnding an abuse 0f discretion
Ms. Ochoa’s motions t0 continue.

in the Magistrate’s denial 0f

A. Standard of Review

A district court’s decision made under its appellate authority is reviewed directly.
Bailey

v.

Bailey, 153 Idaho 526, 529,

284 P.3d 970, 973 (2012). The appellate court does not

review the Magistrate’s decision, but rather afﬁrms 0r reverses the

district court. Id.

grant 0r deny a motion for continuance rests in the discretion 0f the

Thorngren, 149 Idaho 729, 736, 240 P.3d 575, 582 (2010).

trial court.

State

Whether t0
v.

On review 0f a discretionary

decision, the analysis includes whether the court recognized the issue as discretionary, Whether

the decision

was made within

the boundary 0f the court’s discretion and consistent with legal

12

standards, and whether the decision

was produced by an

Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 133 1, 1333 (1989).

by

exercise of reason. State

v.

Hedger, 115

A defendant must show her rights were prejudiced

denial 0f her request for continuance. State

v.

Evans, 129 Idaho 758, 762, 932 P.2d 881, 885

(1997).

The District Court correcth held that the Magistrate abused its discretion in denying Ms.
Ochoa’s requests t0 continue the iurV trial and Ms. Ochoa was prejudiced.

B.

At

the State’s conclusion 0f its argument regarding the denial 0f Ms. Ochoa’s motions t0

continue, the State

comments

not relevant. That

is

t0

Ms. Ochoa

that the

medical records and toxicology results 0f the Victim were

really the crux 0f the State’s position. There cannot possibly

in not allowing sufﬁcient time t0

themselves are not relevant. However,

it

deﬁes

be prejudice

review medical records When the records
all

reason and logic t0 conclude that medical

records of a deceased are not relevant in an involuntary manslaughter case. Medical records

could only be irrelevant in an involuntary manslaughter case
statute,

which seems

The

t0

if the statute

was

a veiled per se

be an overarching theme for the State’s various arguments.

State claims that this case

is

indistinguishable from State

v.

Hansen, 108 Idaho 902,

702 P.2d 1362 (Ct.App. 1985). However, there are several signiﬁcant differences between
case and Hansen. In Hansen, the evidence received

by the defense days before

which analyzed a piece 0f cloth and determined the piece was
the Victim. Id at 903-04, 1363-64. There

is

trial

was a

part of an undergarment

this

report

worn by

no indication how lengthy the report was but

it

contained a simple conclusion. In the case at hand, there were over eight hundred (800) pages of

medical and toxicology records received within a month of the

trial.

More than

half of these

pages were received 0n the eve 0f trial. These documents did not contain one mere simple
conclusion.

They contained

all

accident and the time of death.

the information about the Victim

They

between the time of the car

also contained in-depth information regarding the type
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and

amount 0f substances, both

legal

hospital. Besides being vastly

and

illegal, in the

Victim’s

more voluminous than

body

at the

time he was taken t0 the

the evidence in Hansen,

it

was

also

more

complex.

The

report in

immediately
to

after

it

Hansen was created

was

created. Id.

It

at the

was

behest of the prosecution and turned over

created t0 support the State’s theory 0f the case, not

prove an element 0f the charge. In contrast, the medical and toxicology records in

were created

at the

this case

time 0f the Victim’s death and contained highly probative information as t0 an

element of the crime alleged against Ms. Ochoa. Plus, these highly probative documents were in
the possession 0f the State’s expert before the Charges

They were used

in determining

Whether any charges would even be brought against Ms. Ochoa.

This time frame was obviously well before
disclosure

by claiming

it

trial.

Yet, the State takes cover from the late

did not have actual physical control over the documents.

Lastly, the report in

Hansen contained n0 exculpatory information.

However, the documents

inculpatory.

were even brought against Ms. Ochoa.

in the case at

It

was

clearly

hand did contain exculpatory information.

Information that the State was required to disclose to the defense under the dictates of Brady

Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963) and

its

progeny of cases. Rather

than supporting the State’s contention that there was n0 prejudice, Hansen accentuates just
prejudicial

it

considerable,

It is

was

to

Ms. Ochoa

to

deny her the time necessary

complex information contained

in these

to

trial.

The

State continuously seeks to

documents.

blame Ms. Ochoa

disclosure and seems eager to use the denial 0f a continuance as

for

Ms. Ochoa’s expectation

that the State

would

some

Ochoa

in

for the State’s late

sort ofjust

“punishment”

disclose exculpatory information and
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how

review and analyze the

clear that the State Wishes t0 completely ignore the interests 0f Ms.

obtaining a fair

v.

information that

its

own

effect the late disclosure

experts relied upon.

The

District Court,

however, correctly analyzed the

of such complex material would have on the defense.

It

recognized that

the Magistrate failed t0 take into account the reasonable preparation time that should be expected

under the circumstances. The District Court also recognized the disparity between the
Magistrate’s treatment 0f the State, which

was granted two continuances without even

requirement 0f an argument, and Ms. Ochoa

The

District

Court did not

err in

and unmistakably prejudicial

t0

Who was

the

denied clearly necessary preparation time.

ﬁnding the denial 0f a continuance was an abuse 0f discretion

Ms. Ochoa.
III.

The

ﬁnding that Dr. Groben’s testimony which came directlv
from the medical records was hearsav Which did not ﬁt into anv exception for the
admissibilitv 0f hearsav evidence and was improperlv admitted into evidence.
District

Court did not err

in

A. Standard 0f Review

On appeal,

a decision

Medical Recovery Services,
336 P.3d 802, 804 (2014).

by a

district court

LLC v.

under

its

appellate capacity

On issues

test to

if the Magistrate’s

reviewed

directly.

Bonneville Billing and Collections, Ina, 157 Idaho 395, 397,

of abuse of discretion, the appellate court Will review the

Magistrate’s ﬁndings t0 determine if those ﬁndings were supported

evidence and

is

conclusions

by

came from the ﬁndings.

substantial

Id.

There

is

and competent
a three part

determine Whether there has been an abuse of discretion: (1) did the lower court

understand the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) did the court act Within the boundaries of that
discretion and apply correct legal standards; and (3)

reason. State

v.

Ehrlick, 158 Idaho 900, 907,

was

the decision reached

by an

exercise of

354 P.3d 462, 469 (2014). “In the case 0f an

incorrect ruling regarding evidence, this Court Will grant relief on appeal only if the error affects
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a substantial right 0f one 0f the parties.” Id (quoting Obendorfv. Terra

Hug Spray

C0., 145

Idaho 892, 897, 188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008)).
B.

The

District

Court correctly ruled that Dr. Groben’s testimony from the medical records was

hearsay, did not ﬁt into anV hearsay exception,

deprived Ms. Ochoa of due process

was

therefore inadmissible and

When coupled With the

its

admission

other errors of the Magistrate that are

the subject of this appeal.

The

State argues that the District Court’s analysis 0f this issue

fact

was

Dr.

Groben “was not using

contrary, t0 the record.

The

was not supported, and

State speciﬁcally cites t0 the District Court’s

the medical records as a resource” but

was

ﬁnding

in

that

“referring t0 the medical

records for the medical cause 0f death.” Briefoprp., p. 29 (quoting Clerk’s Record, pp. 248-

49.)

The

State goes

treating the Victim

on

t0 point out that Dr.

Groben testiﬁed

merely documented the Victim’s

it

becomes

medical professionals

injuries but did not determine the cause

death. Id. (quoting Exhibits, p. 159 (Trial Tr., p. 342, L. 18

closer 100k at Dr. Groben’s testimony,

that the

— p.

clear that Dr.

343, L. 12).) However,

Groben was indeed

0f

upon a

getting the

cause of death from the medical records and not merely using them as a resource. While Dr.

Groben

certainly proclaimed at the trial that he

was

the arbiter 0f the cause 0f death, he

previously testiﬁed to the following:

A. Because his injuries were so severe that he died from his

And how d0 you know that,
Because he bled

injuries.

Doctor?

t0 death.

POPC

But d0 you have any —

The medical records say that. Professionals who d0 this for a living got inside the
body and Visually looked at this, documented it, tried t0 treat him, couldn’t, and he
died.

And

I’ve read their reports.

(Exhibits, p.96 (4/23/19 Tn, p. 89, Ls. 16—25).)
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In addition t0 the above colloquy, Dr.

when asked about his use 0f medical
surgery,

it’s

wouldn’t even be able

know

exactly what

4-10.)). Dr.

me t0

absurd for

where they’ve done

because they repaired

it.

So

for

I

me t0

there that caused their injury..." (Exhibits, p. 159 (Trial Tr., p. 342, Ls.

in fact could not formulate his

own

opinion as t0 What actually caused the

Court opined. The District Court was in fact correct in

assessment 0f the relationship between the medical records and Dr. Groben’s function as the

coroner’s representative.

determine
p.

in a case like this

g0 in and 100k because they’ve already repaired everything. So

injuries to the Victim, just as the District

its

“And

also volunteered the following information

t0 tell for sure the injuries for sure

was

Groben

records,

Groben

how to

What Dr. Groben could

categorize an ofﬁcial

d0, and did d0,

is

manner and cause 0f death.

use the medical records t0
(Exhibits, p. 153 (Trial T12,

319, Ls. 13-21).)

Such categorization was plain 0n

its

face and did not warrant a reading 0f speciﬁc

medical information from the medical records. The District Court properly concluded that a
treating physician

would be needed

t0 interpret the contents

of the medical record and that

supported by Dr. Groben’s admission, noted above, that he could not
particular injury. There

ﬁnding

was not

that this hearsay in the

substantial,

competent evidence

is

know what was behind any

t0 support the Magistrate’s

form 0f medical records was admissible under

I.R.E.

703

t0 help

the jury understand the cause of death.

Furthermore, the Magistrate’s decision was directly contrary t0 the holding in State
Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 224 P.3d 485 (2009).

The Watkins court took

v.

great pains t0 review the

changes in I.R.E. 703 that would “prevent an expert witness from serving as a conduit for the
introduction 0f otherwise inadmissible evidence.” Id at 427, 494.

The Magistrate found

that

Watkins was inapplicable because the facts were different, but the Magistrate failed to utilize the
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legal standard set forth in Watkins.

Allowing Dr. Groben’s hearsay testimony

in the

form 0f a

graphic recitation 0f the injuries identiﬁed in the medical records obfuscated the true issue 0f

What was a signiﬁcant
District

factor in contributing t0 the death. This

was

clearly error,

Which the

Court found to be prejudicial to Ms. Ochoa and Which, taken cumulatively, deprived Ms.

Ochoa 0f a

fair trial.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Ochoa respectfully requests

this

her conviction and remanding the case for a

Court afﬁrm the District Court’s decision reversing

new trial.

DATED this 2nd day 0f July, 2020.
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Jill

Baker Musser

Attorney for Alej andra Ochoa
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